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Abstract
We investigate the cyclicality of the private savings to GDP ratio for a panel
of 19 OECD countries over the period 1971-2009. We find robust evidence that
the private savings ratio is countercyclical. Three theories unambiguously predict a
higher private savings ratio during recessions: a Ricardian offset effect, the presence
of credit constraints, and precautionary savings. We find evidence only for the
latter theory. Our estimations take into account a large number of econometric
complications: persistence in the savings ratio, endogeneity of the regressors, cross-
country parameter heterogeneity, cross-sectional dependence, stationarity issues,
omitted variables, and instrument strength.
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 caused the longest recession in the US since World War II;
according to the NBER the recession lasted from December 2007 to June 2009. Not only
the US experienced a long lasting recession, basically the whole developed world under-
went a severe slowdown in economic activity. The fiscal stimulus packages implemented
by governments during this period were enormous. Although these measures probably
dampened the recession to some extent, consumer confidence stayed low and the fiscal
stimuli were not very effective in terms of boosting consumer spending. The effectiveness
of fiscal policy during recessions crucially depends on how the ratio of private consumption
or private savings to GDP responds to the business cycle.
In this paper, we investigate the cyclicality of the private savings to GDP ratio in
OECD countries. Surprisingly, the literature on this topic is scarce. This is unfortunate
because the economic implications of either a procyclical or a countercyclical private
savings ratio are very different. With respect to business cycles, a procyclical savings ratio
implies that business cycle fluctuations are dampened by changes in the private savings
ratio. In that case a recession, for instance, lowers the private savings ratio and increases
the consumption to GDP ratio and therefore boosts aggregate demand. The increased
fiscal multiplier furthermore improves the effectiveness of fiscal policy actions to fight
the recession. A countercyclical private savings ratio, on the other hand, implies that
business cycle fluctuations are amplified by changes in the private savings ratio. Here,
a recession increases the private savings ratio and decreases the consumption to GDP
ratio and therefore lowers aggregate demand. And the lower fiscal multiplier reduces
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the effectiveness of fiscal policy actions to fight the recession. With respect to economic
growth, a procyclical savings ratio implies that during downturns wealth and capital
accumulation fall so that recessions have a negative long-run impact on economic growth,
whilst a countercyclical savings ratio implies that recessions can increase wealth and
capital accumulation and long-run economic growth.
Different economic theories predict contrasting effects of the business cycle on the
private savings ratio (see Carroll and Summers (1987), Carroll (1992)). According to the
consumption smoothing hypothesis which is implied by life cycle/permanent income the-
ories of consumption, the private savings ratio is procyclical. During downturns, income
is temporarily lower and people smooth consumption so that consumption as a fraction of
income rises and saving as a fraction of income falls. During upturns, exactly the opposite
holds; people save relatively more as they have a temporarily higher income. Buffer stock
models that allow for precautionary savings motives, on the other hand, suggest that the
private savings ratio is countercyclical. During recessions, there is more labor income
uncertainty (i.e., a higher risk of unemployment) so that a larger fraction of income is
saved, and vice versa during upturns.
Although not much is known about the cyclicality of the private savings ratio, there
is nonetheless an impressive literature that deals with the determinants of the private
savings ratio (see e.g., Edwards, 1996; Masson et al., 1998; Loayza et al., 2000). Papers
in this literature typically first give an overview of the determinants of private saving
rates based on the theoretical literature. They then use indicators of these theoretical
determinants and estimate reduced-form linear equations to test the main determinants
of private saving rates empirically. In almost all studies the determinants included in the
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savings regressions are the growth rate of per capita real GDP, the inflation rate, the real
interest rate, the credit ratio, the government budget surplus, the size of the social welfare
system and the dependency ratio.1 Although these studies focus on the determinants of
the private savings ratio, no study analyzes the effects of the business cycle on the private
savings ratio. Of course, the business cycle affects the private savings ratio through these
determinants. While some determinants predict a procyclical savings ratio - e.g., real
GDP growth and inflation which are procyclical variables with a documented positive
impact on the private savings ratio - and other determinants predict a countercyclical
private savings ratio - e.g., the government savings ratio which is itself procylical and
is generally acknowledged to have a negative impact on the private savings ratio - the
overall cyclicality of the private savings ratio is not known. Albeit Lane and Tornell
(1998) investigate the cyclicality of the domestic or national savings rate and document
that domestic savings rates in the OECD are procyclical, this evidence cannot tell us much
about the cyclicality of the private savings ratio in OECD countries. The reason is that
the domestic savings to GDP ratio depends both on the private and on the government
savings to GDP ratio, of which the latter is known to be strongly procyclical.
To the best of our knowledge, no systematic and thorough investigation has been
conducted that can shed light on whether the private savings ratio in OECD countries is
procyclical, countercyclical, or acyclical. The aim of our study is to fill this gap in the
literature. To this end, we investigate the cyclicality of the private savings ratio in a panel
of 19 OECD countries using annual data over the period 1971-2009.
In the first part of the paper, we determine whether the private savings ratio in
1We refer to Loayza et al. (2000) for an excellent overview of the literature on the determinants of
private saving rates.
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OECD countries is on average pro-, counter- or acyclical by regressing the private savings
ratio on the lagged private savings ratio and on a business cycle indicator. We use both
unemployment-based and GDP-based business cycle measures. We find robust evidence
that the private savings ratio is countercyclical, i.e., it increases during recessions. To the
best of our knowledge, this result has not been reported elsewhere.
In the second part of the paper, we put forward three theories that unambiguously
predict a higher private savings ratio during recessions: a Ricardian offset effect (see e.g.,
Lopez et al. (2000), de Mello et al. (2004)), the presence of credit constraints (see e.g.,
Jappelli and Pagano (1994)), and the existence of a precautionary savings motive induced
by labor income uncertainty (see e.g., Carroll (1992)). While these theories have been
tested before in the empirical literature on the determinants of the private savings ratio,
our paper reemphasizes their relevance to explain the countercyclicality of the private
savings ratio documented in the first part of the paper. We then test the theories by
regressing the private savings ratio on the lagged private savings ratio and on explanatory
variables that reflect these three theories, i.e., the (cyclical) government savings to GDP
ratio, the (cyclical) private sector credit to GDP ratio, and the (cyclical) unemployment
rate which is used here as a proxy for labor income uncertainty.
Methodologically, we estimate the dynamic private savings regressions put forward in
the paper using a macro panel data approach (i.e., 19 countries, 39 years). A panel data
approach is particularly suited to determine the cyclicality of the private savings ratio
because the number of recessions in a given country over time is relatively low. By using
a panel of countries, the number of recessionary episodes in the sample increases, so that
more reliable and more general conclusions with respect to cyclicality can be obtained.
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We make full use of the panel structure of the data. First, we estimate country-specific
coefficients which are then combined using the mean group (MG) estimator to obtain
estimates for the average effects. This avoids obtaining biased and inconsistent parameter
estimates when falsely assuming that the regression slope parameters are identical across
countries. We refer to Pesaran and Smith (1995) for a general discussion on this issue
and to Haque et al. (1999) for a specific discussion on this issue for savings regressions.
Differences across countries of the impact of the determinants of private savings (like the
business cycle) can for instance be due to cross-country differences in financial systems,
government policies and institutions, and demographics. Second, we allow for cross-
sectional dependence in the data. Recently, the panel literature has emphasized the
potential presence in panel regression errors of omitted unobserved common variables that
have differential impacts on the individual units (see Pesaran (2006)). Especially when
studying macroeconomic data, such unobserved global variables or shocks are likely to be
the rule rather than the exception (see e.g., Bond et al. (2010)). In the context of aggregate
private savings, common factors may for instance be induced by financial liberalization
and, of particular relevance to our application, by common business cycle components. To
take this cross-sectional dependence into account, we use the common correlated effects
(CCE) methodology suggested by Pesaran (2006). The basic idea behind CCE estimation
is to capture the unobserved common factors by including cross-sectional averages of the
dependent and of the explanatory variables as additional regressors in the model. We use
the mean group (CCEMG) variant to allow for possible parameter heterogeneity. We also
use generalized method of moments (GMM) versions of the MG and CCEMG estimators to
account for endogeneity of the explanatory variables (see Everaert and Pozzi (2012)). We
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further tackle potential problems stemming from non-stationarity, instrument weakness
when using the GMM estimators, and omitted variables.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents evidence on the cyclicality
of the private savings ratio in OECD countries, i.e., we show that the private savings
ratio is countercyclical. Section 3 then discusses and tests three theories that can explain
a countercyclical private savings ratio: a Ricardian offset effect, the presence of credit
constraints, and precautionary saving motives. Section 4 concludes.
2 Cyclicality of the private savings ratio: evidence
This section investigates how the private savings to GDP ratio depends on the business
cycle, i.e., whether the private savings ratio is pro- or countercyclical.
2.1 Empirical specification
To estimate the cyclicality of the private savings to GDP ratio for a sample of N countries,
we use the following empirical specification
sit = ηi + αisit−1 + βibcit + εit i = 1, 2, . . . , N, t = 2, . . . , T, (1)
where sit =
SPit
Yit
denotes private savings SPit expressed as a fraction of GDP Yit (both ex-
pressed in real terms) and bcit is a business cycle indicator. We estimate eq.(1) separately
for five business cycle indicators. These indicators are the unemployment rate Uit, the
change in the unemployment rate ∆Uit, the GDP growth rate ∆ lnYit, the output gap
ratio Yit−Y¯it
Y¯it
, and the unemployment gap Uit − U¯it where Y¯it is potential GDP and U¯it is
the natural unemployment rate.
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To capture the persistence in the savings to GDP ratio sit we allow for a dynamic
specification where the savings ratio depends on its own lag sit−1 with 0 < αi < 1. The
dynamics of sit are therefore allowed to differ from those of bcit and the slope coefficient
βi measures the impact of the business cycle on savings keeping the impact of past values
of the business cycle variable bcit−j (for j > 0) on sit constant. The total long-run impact
of the business cycle on private savings is then given by βi
1−αi .
Unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity is captured by the individual effect ηi. We
also allow for heterogeneity across countries in the slope coefficients αi and βi which
reflects the fact that private savings in different countries may react differently to a given
change in the business cycle, for example because financial systems, demographics, and
government institutions and policies differ across countries (e.g., the generosity of welfare
benefits).
The error term εit can be characterized by error cross-sectional dependence implying
that it is affected by a number of unobserved common factors that affect all countries in
the sample, albeit with a potentially different impact for each country, i.e., heterogeneous
cross-sectional dependence.2 This reflects the fact that the private savings ratio sit can be
driven by for instance a common international business cycle or a common international
trend in financial liberalization. It should be noted that if εit contains a international
business cycle component then controlling for error cross-sectional dependence affects the
interpretation of the slope coefficient βi on the business cycle indicator bcit. Rather than
2Model the error term εit as εit = γift +ωit where ft is a vector of unobserved common factors, γi is a
vector of country-specific factor loadings, and where ωit is a mean zero error term which is uncorrelated
over cross sections. Allowing for country-specific factor loadings implies that cross-sectional dependence
is heterogeneous and this nests homogenous cross-sectional dependence (i.e., the common time effects of
time dummies where γi = γ ∀i) as a special case.
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measuring the total impact of bcit on sit we then measure the impact of the business cycle
on private savings given the stance of the international business cycle. The estimation
methods discussed in section 2.2 allow for cross-sectional dependence in the error term
εit.
Note further that the error term εit can be autocorrelated, where the autocorrelation is
of the moving average form3, and it can be heteroskedastic both over time and over cross
sections. The error term εit can also be correlated contemporaneously with the variable
bcit, implying that for the coefficient βi to reflect a causal relationship going from bcit to
sit we need to control for the endogeneity of bcit. The estimation methods discussed in
the next section are adequate to deal with all these possibilities.
2.2 Methodology
Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that in a dynamic heterogeneous panel data model like in
eq.(1), pooled estimators, like for instance the fixed effects estimator, in general provide
inconsistent (for large N and T ) estimates for the average effects α = N−1
∑N
i=1 αi and
β = N−1
∑N
i=1 βi. To overcome this problem, they suggest averaging over country-by-
country coefficient estimates, i.e., α̂ = N−1
∑N
i=1 α̂i and β̂ = N
−1∑N
i=1 β̂i. This yields
consistent estimates for the average effects α and β for both N, T → ∞ provided that
α̂i and β̂i are consistent for T → ∞. We outline four alternative estimators for the
country-specific coefficients αi and βi. This will result in four alternative estimators for
the average effects. Following Pesaran (2006), the asymptotic covariance matrix Σ for
3For instance due to measurement error in the data (see Loayza et al. (2000)).
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each of these average estimators is consistently estimated nonparametrically4 by
Σ̂ =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
 α̂i − α̂
β̂i − β̂
[ α̂i − α̂ β̂i − β̂ ] . (2)
If we ignore error cross-sectional dependence, direct estimation of αi and βi in the
model in eq.(1) is possible using ordinary least squares (OLS) on eq.(1). The average
over the N country-specific OLS estimates is referred to as the mean group (MG) esti-
mator. Abstracting from potential endogeneity of bcit and a possible MA component in
εit, country-by-country OLS estimation of the autoregressive model in eq.(1) yields biased
but consistent (as T → ∞) estimates for αi and βi. In this case, the MG estimator is
consistent for both N, T →∞.
If bcit is endogenous and/or if εit follows an MA(q) process with q > 0 the MG esti-
mator is inconsistent. Therefore, our second estimator for αi and βi is a GMM estimator
that uses an appropriate number of periods lagged values of sit and bcit as instruments for
sit−1 and bcit. The appropriate lag depth depends on the order q of the MA component in
εit, i.e., the first available lags are sit−1−q and bcit−1−q. Adding deeper lags improves the
efficiency of the GMM estimator. However, in order to avoid problems related to using too
many instruments, we only use the first 2 available lags. This results in the instrument
set (sit−1−q, sit−2−q, bcit−1−q, bcit−2−q). The country-by-country GMM estimates are then
averaged over the N countries to obtain the MG-GMM estimator.
If we allow for error cross-sectional dependence, Pesaran (2006) shows that the cross-
4Since the standard errors are estimated using only the country-specific coefficient estimates, they are
robust to the use of ”generated” regressors like the cyclical variables used in this paper (e.g., the output
gap ratio, the unemployment gap,...). This does not hold for the (unreported) country-specific standard
errors.
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sectional averages of sit, sit−1, and bcit are suitable proxies for the unobserved common
factors. Country-by-country OLS estimation of the regression equation in eq.(1) aug-
mented with the cross-sectional averages st, st−1, and bct as additional regressors gives
the CCE estimator suggested by Pesaran (2006). The average over the N country-specific
CCE estimates is referred to as the mean group (CCEMG) estimator. Abstracting from
potential endogeneity of bcit and a possible MA component in εit, country-by-country
CCE estimation of the autoregressive model in eq.(1) yields biased but consistent (as
T → ∞) estimates for αi and βi. In this case, the CCEMG estimator is consistent for
both N, T →∞.
If bcit is endogenous and/or if εit follows an MA(q) process with q > 0 the CCEMG
estimator is inconsistent. Therefore, we use GMM in the country-by-country estimation
of the regression equation augmented with the cross-sectional averages st, st−1 and bct.
As N →∞ the cross-sectional averages st, st−1 and bct are exogenous while appropriate
instruments for sit−1 and bcit are as before (sit−1−q, si,t−2−q, bcit−1−q, bcit−2−q). Also letting
T → ∞, this yields consistent country-by-country CCE-GMM estimates. These CCE-
GMM estimates are then averaged over the N countries to obtain the CCEMG-GMM
estimator.
2.3 Results
Eq.(1) is estimated using aggregate yearly data for 19 OECD countries (N = 19) over the
period 1971-2009. The selection of countries and the sample period is determined by data
availability and the aim to have as many time periods as possible for a reasonably large set
of countries. More details about the countries included in the panel and about the data
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can be found in Appendix A. Table 1 reports the estimation results for each of the business
cycle indicators. The reported coefficients are the average over 19 countries of the country-
specific estimates for αi and βi. As motivated in the previous subsection, the GMM
estimators are constructed using sit−1−q, sit−2−q, bcit−1−q, and bcit−2−q as instruments
for the variables sit−1 and bcit. The Cumby and Huizinga (1992) autocorrelation test
indicates that there is no autocorrelation in the residuals for all the estimation reported
in Table 1, i.e., the order of the MA component in the residuals is q = 0 (more details
can be found below). The instrument set used is therefore (sit−1, si,t−2, bcit−1, bcit−2). The
reported GMM estimators are two-step estimators for which the optimal weighting matrix
is constructed using a White estimator allowing for heteroscedasticity.
Before discussing the specific coefficient estimates, we look at the outcomes of some
diagnostic tests reported in Table 1.5 We report the average Cumby and Huizinga (1992)
autocorrelation test (CH) over 19 countries and its p-value. The CH test for residual
autocorrelation is particularly suitable as it allows the model to have MA errors and to
be estimated by a variety of GMM estimators, including the ones used in this paper. The
results show that the null of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected against the alternative
of MA(1) errors for any of the conducted estimations.
For the MG and MG-GMM estimators we apply the Pesaran (2004) cross-section
dependence (CD) test, which tests for cross-sectional independence in the error term.
In all cases the null of cross-sectional independence is rejected, suggesting that there is
5Note that, with the exception of the Pesaran (2004) cross-section dependence test, the other tests used
are calculated per country and then averaged. Of these, the Hansen (1982) and the Cumby and Huizinga
(1992) test statistics follow a χ2 distribution. Assuming that the country-specific test statistics are
independent, the average Hansen (1982) and Cumby and Huizinga (1992) test still follow a χ2 distribution
with the same number of degrees of freedom as their country-specific counterparts.
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cross-sectional dependence in the error term and justifying the use of CCE estimators.
For the GMM estimators, we report the average Hansen (1982) J test of overidentifying
restrictions over 19 countries and its p-value. For all the conducted GMM estimations,
we conclude that the moment conditions implied by the instrument sets are not rejected
by the data.
The results of the Hansen J test may however not be very informative when instru-
ments are weak. To find out whether our instruments are potentially weak we use the
Cragg and Donald (1993) test.6 Stock and Yogo (2004) present the critical values for
this type of the test. The 5% critical value that limits the bias of the (first-step) GMM
estimator to 30% of the inconsistency of the OLS estimator is about 5.5 in the case of
one endogenous variable. Comparing the average Cragg-Donald test statistic reported
in Table 1 for the GMM estimators with this critical value shows that we can reject the
null hypothesis that the instruments are weak for 7 out of 10 GMM estimations. The
instruments seem to be weak especially when the GDP growth rate is taken as a business
cycle indicator.
The point estimates reported in Table 1 show that the coefficient on the lagged private
savings ratio is always close to or higher than 0.7 and significant at the 1% level which
implies that the private savings to GDP ratio is highly persistent.
The upper part of Table 1 shows the estimation results where unemployment-based
measures serve as indicators for the business cycle. We distinguish between three mea-
6In Table 1 we report the results of estimating eq.(1) which contains only one potentially endogenous
variable. In this case the Cragg-Donald statistic is identical to the F-statistic of the joint significance of
the instruments in the first-stage regression. In the next section of the paper we have multiple endogenous
regressors in which case the F-statistic is not informative to test the weakness of the instruments, while
the Cragg-Donald test can still be used.
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sures; the unemployment rate Uit (a), the change in the unemployment rate ∆Uit (b), and
the unemployment gap Uit − U¯it (c). These are countercyclical variables, i.e., they tend
to increase during recessions. The estimated coefficients on any of these business cycle
indicators are always positive and in most cases significant at the 1% or 5% level.7 These
results imply that the private savings to GDP ratio is countercyclical, i.e., it is higher
during recessions (when unemployment is relatively high).
In the lower part of Table 1 we report the estimation results obtained when using
GDP-based measures for the business cycle. We use the GDP growth rate ∆ lnYit (d)
and the output gap ratio Yit−Y¯it
Y¯it
(e) as indicators for the business cycle. These are pro-
cyclical variables, i.e., they tend to decrease during recessions. A countercyclical private
savings ratio will therefore correspond to negative estimated coefficients for these indi-
cators in the regression equation, eq.(1). We do find negative coefficient estimates when
the estimations are conducted with the output gap as a business cycle indicator. The
estimates are always significant at the 1% level. The estimated coefficients on the GDP
growth rate, however, are not significant when the MG and MG-GMM estimators are
used and positive and significant when the CCEMG and CCEMG-GMM estimators are
used. This contrasts with the results obtained with the other business cycle measures.
We provide two explanations. First, the GDP growth rate is not necessarily a good
indicator of the business cycle. It also contains a long-run growth component and, as
such, may be less suitable to analyze the effect of the business cycle on private savings.
It should be noted that most empirical studies find a positive effect of income or GDP
growth on the private savings ratio (e.g., Masson et al., 1998; Loayza et al., 2000). This
7The only exception is the CCEMG estimation of eq.(1) conducted with the change in the unemploy-
ment rate as a business cycle indicator where we find an insignificant coefficient.
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is often seen as direct support for the life-cycle hypothesis. Indeed, Modigliani (1970)
already argued that income growth will affect private savings positively in a life-cycle
setting. In a growing economy, the savings of the working population will be higher than
the dissavings of retirees and therefore aggregate savings will increase. This constitutes
the savings effect of permanent changes in GDP growth rates, while we are investigating
the savings effect of temporary changes in GDP growth rates (i.e., the business cycle).
Probably, the permanent GDP growth effect dominates the temporary GDP growth ef-
fect in the above regressions conducted with GDP growth as a business cycle indicator.
Second, as explained above, the Cragg-Donald test statistic indicates that the instrument
set used is weak when using real GDP growth as a business cycle meaure. This implies
that we should interpret the GMM estimations conducted with the GDP growth rate with
caution. Based on these objections we ignore the estimations conducted with the GDP
growth rate and we conclude that there is robust evidence that the private savings ratio
is countercyclical, i.e., it increases during recessions.
With the widely used output gap ratio measure Yit−Y¯it
Y¯it
as our preferred business cy-
cle indicator, we find that an increase in the output gap ratio by 1 percentage point8
coincides with a decrease in the savings to GDP ratio by 0.13 percentage points (MG
estimator) or 0.15 percentage points (CCEMG estimator). This effect is larger when con-
trolling for endogeneity and reverse causality with the GMM estimators, in which case
an increase in the output gap by 1 percentage point causes a decrease in the savings to
GDP ratio by 0.30 percentage points (MG-GMM estimator) or 0.36 percentage points
(CCEMG-GMM estimator). Note that controlling for cross-sectional dependence (which
8Over the sample period and over all countries in the sample the standard deviation of the output
gap ratio equals about 2 percentage points.
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potentially includes cross-sectional dependence caused by common international business
cycles) with the use of CCE estimators (CCEMG, CCEMG-GMM) increases the mea-
sured countercyclicality, albeit the increase is rather modest. Of course, these effects are
noticeably larger in the long-run. Not controlling for endogeneity or reverse causality, the
total long-run impact of an increase of the output gap ratio by 1 percentage point is a
decrease of the private savings ratio by either 0.62 percentage points (MG estimator) or
0.57 percentage points (CCEMG estimator). When controlling for endogeneity or reverse
causality with the GMM estimators, this total long-run impact equals 1.68 percentage
points (MG-GMM estimator) or 1.58 percentage points (CCEMG-GMM estimator).
In this section we have reported robust evidence that suggests that the private savings
to GDP ratio in OECD countries is countercyclical. In the remainder of the paper we
provide three theoretical explanations for this result and we empirically investigate which
explanation is most supported by the data.
3 Explaining a countercyclical private savings ratio
3.1 Theory
In this section we discuss three theories that unambiguously predict that the private sav-
ings ratio is countercyclical, i.e., that the private savings ratio is higher during recessions
and lower during upturns.
The first theory that could explain the countercyclicality of the private savings ratio
is the Ricardian Equivalence theorem (Barro, 1974). According to this theory it does not
matter whether the government finances its spending through taxes or debt. The general
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idea is that if the goverment finances its deficit by issuing debt, rational agents know that
this implies higher future taxes and increase their savings by exactly the amount as the rise
in government debt. The theory of Ricardian equivalence has been discussed extensively
in the past by the economics profession. On the one hand, it is argued that the existing
evidence does not support the existence of Ricardian equivalence (see, e.g., Bernheim,
1987), while others claim that, in general, empirical work supports Ricardian equivalence
(Seater, 1993). More recent studies (see, e.g., Lopez et al., 2000; de Mello et al., 2004)
tend to reject full Ricardian equivalence, but find strong evidence of a partial Ricardian
offset effect of private saving in response to changes in public saving. As the government
savings ratio typically falls during recessions (i.e., the government deficit increases), there
can therefore be a (partial) Ricardian offset by individuals in response, i.e., private savings
increase relative to income. To test whether the countercyclical private savings ratio is
driven by a Ricardian offset effect we use government savings expressed as a fraction of
GDP as an indicator. According to the reasoning above we expect a negative coefficient
for this variable; during a boom the government savings ratio is higher and the private
savings ratio will be lower, and vice versa during a recession.
A second explanation for the countercyclical behavior of the private savings ratio is
the existence of credit constraints. In general, liquidity constraints on households raise
the saving rate (see, e.g., Jappelli and Pagano, 1994). The fact that some individuals
are liquidity constrained is often used to explain why the permanent income/life cycle
hypothesis is rejected by a lot of empirical studies (Jappelli and Pagano, 1989; Zeldes,
1989), but borrowing constraints can also explain the cyclicality of savings. During re-
cessions borrowing constraints are more binding and therefore people consume less and
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save relatively more, and the opposite holds when the economy is doing well (see also
Deaton (1991)). To test whether credit constraints are responsible for the countercyclical
savings ratio we use the total domestic credit to the private sector expressed as a fraction
of GDP as an indicator. We expect a negative sign for the coefficient on the credit ratio;
a recession leads to a fall of the credit ratio, implying that the private sector faces tighter
credit constraints, which leads to an increase of the private savings ratio, and vice versa
during a boom.
The existence of precautionary saving motives is the third theory that can explain the
countercyclical behaviour of the private savings to GDP ratio. According to this theory
the private savings ratio increases when there is more (labor) income uncertainty (Leland,
1968; Caballero, 1991). Carroll (1992) argues that precautionary savings are important
to understand the cyclical behavior of savings and emphasizes the role of unemployment
expectations. A higher probability to become unemployed creates more uncertainty about
future labor income, and in response consumers increase their target buffer-stock of saving
and increase their savings.9 This implies that during periods of relatively high unemploy-
ment (i.e., recessions), the private savings ratio is higher, and vice versa in periods with
relatively low unemployment (upturns). To test the precautionary savings explanation of
the countercyclicality of the private savings ratio we therefore follow Carroll and Summers
(1987) and Carroll (1992) by using the unemployment rate as a proxy for labor income
uncertainty and we expect a positive coefficient on this variable.10
9This mechanism is also studied by Challe and Ragot (2012) who study the macroeconomic implica-
tions of time-varying precautionary saving in a general equilibrium model with unemployment risk.
10Engen and Gruber (2001) also argue that the risk of wage losses due to unemployment is a key
element of future income uncertainty. They use differences in unemployment insurance among US states
to test the precautionary saving hypothesis empirically and find support for this hypothesis as they find
significant crowding out effects of unemployment insurance on financial asset holdings of households.
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3.2 Testing the theory
In this section we investigate which of our three alternative theoretical explanations for a
countercyclical private savings ratio are supported by the data. First, in section 3.2.1, we
formally test the cyclicality of the variables used to test the three theories: the government
savings ratio, the private credit ratio, and the unemployment rate. Section 3.2.2 then
analyses whether we can find empirical support for the theories by regressing the private
savings ratio on these variables.
3.2.1 Cyclicality governments savings ratio, credit ratio, and unemployment
rate
In the previous section we discussed how the variables used to test the theories supporting
a countercyclical savings ratio can be expected to move over the business cycle. Here we
check whether these expectations are confirmed in our dataset. We estimate the following
regression equation for each of the variables,
xit = ηi + αixit−1 + βi
Yit − Y¯it
Y¯it
+ εit i = 1, 2, . . . , N, t = 2, . . . , T, (3)
where xit = (
SGit
Yit
, CREit
Yit
, Uit), the three variables used to test the theories that can explain
our documented countercyclical private savings ratio. As mentioned in section 3.1 we use
government savings SGit as a fraction of GDP Yit to test the Ricardian offset effect, domestic
credit to the private sector CREit as a fraction of GDP Yit to test the importance of credit
constraints, while the unemployment rate Uit serves as an indicator for the precautionary
savings theory. We regress each of these indicators on the output put gap ratio Yit−Y¯it
Y¯it
,
our preferred measure of the business cycle. We use annual data on these variables for 19
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OECD countries (N = 19) over the period 1971-2009. More details on the data can be
found in Appendix A. Following the reasoning of section 3.1, we expect the following signs
for βi in each of the regressions: βi > 0 when xit = (
SGit
Yit
, CREit
Yit
) if the government savings
ratio and the credit ratio are procyclical and βi < 0 when xit = Uit if the unemployment
rate is countercyclical.
As in section 2.1 we estimate a dynamic specification by adding the lagged dependent
variable xit−1 to the regression equation. And, as before, we take into account unobserved
time-invariant heterogeneity through the individual effect ηi and heterogeneity in the
slope coefficients αi and βi. We also allow for heterogenous cross-sectional dependence,
cross-section and time series heteroskedasticity in the error term εit, and endogeneity of
the regressor Yit−Y¯it
Y¯it
. We use the four estimators discussed in section 2.2.
The estimation results are reported in Table 3 in Appendix D. The reported coeffi-
cients are the average over 19 countries of the country-specific estimates for αi and βi.
The GMM estimators are two-step estimators for which the optimal weighting matrix is
constructed using a White estimator allowing for heteroskedasticity, and are constructed
using (xit−1, xit−2,
Yit−1−Y¯it−1
Y¯it−1
, Yit−2−Y¯it−2
Y¯it−2
) as an instrument set.
The estimated coefficients on the output gap always have the expected sign and are
almost always significant at the 1% level.11 These results show that the government
savings ratio is procyclical, i.e., it increases when the economy is doing well and falls
during recessions. The effect of the business cycle on the credit ratio is also as expected;
during downturns the credit ratio falls and during upturns it rises. This implies that
credit constraints are more binding during recessions. And finally, the estimation results
11There is one exception when the MG-GMM estimator is used to test the cyclicality of the government
savings ratio.
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indicate that the unemployment rate is countercyclical, i.e., it is higher in recessions and
lower when there is a boom.12
After providing some basic evidence for the direction of the cyclicality of the variables
used to test the three theoretical explanations for the documented countercyclical behavior
of the private savings ratio, we can now investigate whether there is empirical support for
these theories. This will be the subject of the next subsection.
3.2.2 Regressing the private savings ratio on the governments savings ratio,
the credit ratio, and the unemployment rate
We first estimate a basic specification where the private savings ratio is regressed on
the three variables that predict a countercyclical savings ratio: the government savings
ratio, the private credit ratio, and the unemployment rate. We then discuss econometric
problems that cast some doubt on the reliability of the results. Finally, we estimate an
alternative specification that is not subject to the econometric problems mentioned.
a) Basic specification
We estimate the following regression equation,
sit = ηi + αisit−1 + βisGit + γicreit + δiUit + εit i = 1, 2, . . . , N, t = 2, . . . , T, (4)
12As can be noticed from Table 3, the Cumby and Huizinga (1992) autocorrelation test often indicates
that there is autocorrelation in the error terms and the Hansen (1982) J test rejects the null hypothesis
of the joint validity of the used instrument set in a number of cases. In principle, these problems can
be solved by including MA components in the residuals and adjusting the instrument set by starting
at later lags. The problem is, however, that when deeper lags are used as instruments, the Cragg and
Donald (1993) test indicates that there might be a weak instruments problem. Allowing for MA errors
does not alter the signs and significance of our estimated coefficients and does therefore not change our
main conclusions.
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where sit =
SPit
Yit
denotes private savings SPit expressed as a fraction of GDP Yit, where
sGit =
SGit
Yit
indicates government savings SGit expressed as a fraction of GDP Yit, where
creit =
CREit
Yit
stands for domestic credit to the private sector CREit expressed as a
fraction of GDP Yit, and where Uit is the unemployment rate. From our discussion in
section 3.1 we expect the following signs for the estimated parameters: βi < 0 (Ricardian
offset effect), γi < 0 (credit constraints), and δi > 0 (precautionary savings).
Eq.(4) is estimated with data for our 19 OECD countries (N = 19) over the period
1971-2009. The estimation results are presented in Table 2 (left panel). The reported
coefficients are the average over 19 countries of the country-specific estimates for αi, βi, γi,
and δi. We use the MG, MG-GMM, CCEMG, and CCEMG-GMM estimators as detailed
in section 2.2. As the Cumby and Huizinga (1992) autocorrelation test reported in Table 2
(left panel) indicates that there is no autocorrelation in the residuals for all the estimations
reported, the instrument set used is
(
sit−1, sit−2, sGit−1, s
G
it−2, creit−1, creit−2, Uit−1, Uit−2
)
.
The coefficient estimates obtained after estimating eq.(4) suggest, first, that a lower
government savings ratio (i.e., a higher deficit) - which is typical for a recession - implies
a higher private savings to GDP ratio (i.e., βi < 0). This is in accordance with what
is predicted by the Ricardian Equivalence theorem even though the offset effect is only
partial (see also e.g., Lopez et al. (2000)). The negative effect is significant at the 1%
level for three of the four estimators used in the estimation. The effect is still negative
when using the MG-GMM estimator, though insignificant. Since the CD test reported in
Table 2 (left panel) suggests that cross-sectional dependence is an issue, we are inclined
to give more weight to the results obtained with the CCEMG-GMM estimator. As such,
we could conclude that the Ricardian offset effect is present and might be responsible
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for the documented countercyclicality of the private savings ratio. Second, from Table
2 (left panel) we also note that the credit ratio has a negative and significant (at the
1% level) impact on the private savings ratio irrespective of the estimator that we use
(i.e., γi < 0). This result suggests that a tightening of credit constraints faced by the
private sector - something typical for a recession - which is reflected by a decrease of the
credit ratio leads to an increase of the private savings ratio. We could therefore conclude
that credit constraints might also be responsible for the documented countercyclicality
of the private savings ratio. Third, the unemployment rate, used as a proxy for labor
income uncertainty, does not have a significant positive impact on the private savings
ratio. A positive and significant impact would suggest that the savings ratio is driven
by precautionary motives. It does have a positive, but insignificant, impact when the
GMM estimators are used. As a result, we do not find convincing evidence in support of
a precautionary savings motive driving the documented countercyclicality of the private
savings ratio.
These conclusions, drawn from the results obtained from estimating eq.(4), may how-
ever be misleading. There are three econometric reasons for this: weak instruments,
non-stationarity issues, and omitted variables. We discuss each in turn.
Weak instruments
The estimations conducted with GMM estimators are plagued by a potential weak in-
struments problem. If instruments are weak, point estimates are potentially biased and
inference may be unreliable. In the case of three endogenous variables the 5% critical
value that limits the bias of the (first-step) GMM estimator to 30% of the inconsistency
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of the OLS estimator is about 4.5 (see Stock and Yogo (2004)). In Table 2 (left panel)
we find values for the Cragg and Donald (1993) test that are below this critical value so
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak.
Non-stationarity
Panel unit root tests conducted on the variables of eq.(4) reveal that we can convincingly
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the variables sit, s
G
it , and Uit but that we cannot
reject the hypothesis of a unit root in the credit ratio creit. The results of these panel
unit root tests are presented in Table 4 in Appendix D. The presence of a non-stationary
variable as a regressor in eq.(4) may lead to inconsistent estimation of the parameters of
eq.(4) and to unreliable inference.
Omitted variables
We include in our regression only variables that imply a countercyclical private savings
ratio, i.e., procyclical variables with a potentially negative impact on the savings ratio
(i.e., the variables sGit and creit) or countercyclical variables with a potentially positive
impact on the savings ratio (i.e., the variable Uit). We do not include variables that
predict a procyclical savings ratio, i.e., procyclical variables with a potentially positive
impact on the private savings ratio or countercyclical variables with a potentially negative
impact on the savings ratio. Variables that predict a procyclical savings ratio are real
GDP growth, the inflation rate and the government transfers to GDP ratio.13 Real GDP
13The private sector wealth to GDP ratio also belongs to this category. The wealth ratio is problematic
because it is a variable for which there are no good data available for all countries in the panel and, as
a result, it is seldom included in private savings studies. However, the countercyclicality of the private
savings ratio documented in Section 2 implies a countercyclical private wealth ratio since the change
in private wealth equals private savings. Both lifecycle/permanent income and buffer stock theories of
consumption further predict an unambiguously negative impact of the private wealth ratio on the private
savings ratio.
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growth is a procyclical variable and from the life cycle/permanent income hypothesis
and consumption smoothing theory we expect a positive impact on the private savings
ratio. This is also what is found in the empirical literature on the determinants of the
private saving rate; see e.g., Masson et al. (1998); Loayza et al. (2000). Inflation is also
a procyclical variable for which in general a positive impact on the private savings ratio
is expected (the macroeconomic instability argument) and found (see e.g., Loayza et al.
(2000)).14 The government transfers to GDP ratio, on the other hand, is a countercyclical
variable for which we expect a negative impact on the private savings ratio as government
transfers can substitute for precautionary private savings; see e.g., Callen and Thimann
(1997).
The reason for not including these variables is that the more endogenous variables we
add to the regression, the larger the weak instruments problem becomes, and the harder it
gets to alleviate the weak instruments problem through the use of fully robust techniques
(see below). The latter techniques are based on a grid search and suffer from the curse of
dimensionality, i.e., these techniques are difficult to apply when there are more than three
endogenous regressors. Of course, to the extent that the included and excluded variables
are correlated, our estimates may be plagued by an omitted variables bias.
Given the nature of the variables that we exclude however (i.e., variables that predict
a procyclical savings ratio), the direction of the omitted variables bias should be quantifi-
able. Intuitively, given an overall countercyclical private savings ratio, excluding variables
14The real interest rate is another procyclical variable that is often included in private savings regres-
sions. In general the estimated impact of the real interest rate on the private savings to GDP ratio in
the literature is found to be small and insignificant (see e.g., Loayza et al. (2000)). This result probably
reflects the theoretical ambiguity concerning the effect of interest rates on saving (resulting from opposing
income and substitution effects).
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in our regression that predict a procyclical private savings ratio will underestimate the
impact of the variables that predict a countercyclical savings ratio. We clarify this with
an example. Suppose that the overall increase of the savings ratio in a recession is 1
percentage point. And suppose that this constitutes the net effect of an increase of 2 per-
centage points in the savings ratio due to an increase in the unemployment rate (included
countercyclical variable that predicts a countercyclical savings ratio) and a decrease of
1 percentage point in the savings ratio due to an increase in the government transfer to
GDP ratio (excluded countercyclical variable that predicts a procyclical savings ratio).
By only including the former variable and not the latter, we attribute the overall increase
in the savings ratio in the recession (1 percentage point) solely to the change in the un-
employment rate. As such, we underestimate the true impact of the unemployment rate
on the private savings ratio. In technical terms, the point estimates for the parameters
on sGit , creit, Uit in eq.(4) are in absolute value lower bounds to the true impact these
variables have on the private savings ratio. In Appendix B we derive this mathemati-
cally. This lower bound result is convenient because it implies that if we find a significant
impact on the private savings ratio of our included variables, then we can conclude that
this constitutes convincing evidence in favour of our theories, as the true impact of these
variables is probably higher than the estimated impact, but definitely not lower.
The condition for this lower bound result to hold is that covariance between the
included variables and the excluded variables reflects the business cycle. This is not
necessarily the case, however. In the example above we obtain a lower bound for the
impact of the unemployment rate on savings (1 percentage point instead of 2) because
- due to the recession - the excluded transfer to GDP ratio increases (and lowers the
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private savings ratio) whilst the unemployment rate increases (and augments the private
savings ratio). It is however conceivable that the covariance between the included and
excluded variables is not dominated by the business cycle but by other (maybe more
structural) factors. Suppose for example that a structural increase in the unemployment
rate decreases the generosity of the government; in order to keep the system affordable
the government transfer to GDP ratio is reduced. In this case, the excluded transfer to
GDP ratio decreases (and increases the private savings ratio) when the unemployment
rate increases (which also increases the private savings ratio). Obviously, excluding the
government transfer to GDP ratio from the regression now overstates the impact of the
unemployment rate on the private savings ratio; the private savings ratio increases both
because of the increase in the unemployment rate and because of the fall in the transfer
to GDP ratio, but this twofold increase is attributed solely to the unemployment rate.
As such, if the covariance between the included variables and the excluded variables in
eq.(4) does not reflect the business cycle - as is perfectly possible -, then the lower bound
result for the estimated parameters on our included regressors in eq.(4) does not hold.
Hence, we do not know the direction of the omitted variables bias, and we cannot conclude
anything.
Given these three econometric problems we now turn to an alternative specification
where we try to tackle these problems.
b) Specification with cyclical regressors
We deal with the problems mentioned in the previous subsection by estimating a savings
regression with only the cyclical components of the variables sGit , creit, and Uit included
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Table 2: Determinants countercyclical private savings ratio: estimation results eqs.(4) and (5)
Dependent variable: sit Sample period: 1971-2009, 19 countries
Eq.(4) Eq.(5)
MG MG-GMM CCEMG CCEMG-GMM MG MG-GMM CCEMG CCEMG-GMM
sit−1 0.628∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.049) (0.054) (0.057) (0.044) (0.046) (0.042) (0.050)
sGit -0.329
∗∗∗ -0.097 -0.537∗∗∗ -0.351∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.079) (0.077) (0.096)
creit -0.014
∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.011)
Uit -0.173
∗∗ 0.064 -0.049 0.215
(0.075) (0.079) (0.142) (0.179)
s˜Git -0.383
∗∗∗ -0.020 -0.570∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗
(0.059) (0.089) (0.077) (0.135)
c˜reit -0.006 -0.002 -0.017 0.005
(0.015) (0.025) (0.016) (0.028)
U˜it 0.054 0.452
∗∗∗ 0.127 0.474∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.139) (0.118) (0.108)
Cumby-Huizinga test 1.621 1.290 0.987 1.300 1.179 1.153 1.199 1.389
[0.203] [0.256] [0.321] [0.254] [0.278] [0.283] [0.273] [0.239]
Pesaran CD test 8.955 8.828 9.036 6.175
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Hansen test 5.148 5.486 5.407 6.128
[0.272] [0.241] [0.248] [0.190]
Cragg-Donald test 5.199 1.889 1.660 0.907
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values are in square brackets. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% respectively. The GMM estimators use a consistent estimate for the optimal weighting matrix constructed from a White
estimator allowing for heteroskedasticity. The Cumby-Huizinga test shows the average of the individual countries’ Cumby and
Huizinga (1992) autocorrelation test, testing the null of no autocorrelation against the alternative of MA(1) errors. The Pesaran
CD test is the Pesaran (2004) test, testing the null of cross-sectional independence. The Hansen test shows the average of the
individual countries’ Hansen (1982) J-test of overidentifying restrictions which tests the joint validity of the instruments used.
The Cragg-Donald test is the average of the individual countries’ Cragg and Donald (1993) test statistic for weak instruments.
as regressors. Cyclical regressors contain no unit roots by definition and their correlation
with the excluded variables is dominated by business cycle movements. We have calculated
the correlations of the cyclical components of sGit , creit, and Uit with the three excluded
variables mentioned above: real GDP growth, inflation, and the government transfers
to GDP ratio. We find the expected signs, e.g., the correlation between the cyclical
component of Uit and inflation/real GDP growth is negative, the correlation between the
cyclical component of Uit and the transfers to GDP ratio is positive, and so on... .
15 As a
result, the direction of the omitted variables bias is known, and the estimated parameters
can be considered lower bounds to the true parameters. After estimating this alternative
specification, we tackle potential weak instruments problems with the use of fully robust
15Results are unreported but are available from the authors on request.
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techniques.
We estimate the following regression equation,
sit = ηi + αisit−1 + βis˜Git + γic˜reit + δiU˜it + εit i = 1, 2, . . . , N, t = 2, . . . , T, (5)
where s˜Git is the cyclical government savings ratio, c˜reit is cyclical credit ratio, and where
U˜it is the cyclical unemployment rate which equals the unemployment gap Uit− U¯it. From
our discussion in section 3.1 we expect the following signs for the estimated parameters:
βi < 0 (Ricardian offset effect), γi < 0 (credit constraints), and δi > 0 (precautionary
savings).
For the calculation of the variables and for details on the data we refer to Appendix A.
We estimate eq.(5) using yearly data for our 19 OECD countries over the period 1971-2009
using the four estimators presented in section 2.2 (i.e., the MG estimator, the MG-GMM
estimator, the CCEMG estimator, and the CCEMG-GMM estimator). The estimation
results are presented in Table 2 (right panel). The reported coefficients are the average
over 19 countries of the country-specific estimates for αi, βi, γi, and δi. The instrument
set is
(
sit−1, sit−2, s˜Git−1, s˜
G
it−2, c˜reit−1, c˜reit−2, U˜it−1, U˜it−2
)
for the GMM estimators, since
the Cumby and Huizinga (1992) autocorrelation test reported in Table 2 (right panel)
indicates that autocorrelation is not an issue in our estimations.
The coefficient estimates obtained from the estimation of eq.(5) show that using cycli-
cal components has an important impact on the results. First, whereas the credit ratio
has a significant negative impact on the savings ratio, the same is not true for the cyclical
credit ratio. The impact of the latter is very close to zero (in particular for the GMM
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estimators) and insignificant. This result seems to indicate that there is a structural
negative impact of credit on private savings - for instance due to a relaxation of credit
constraints caused by financial liberalization - but not a cyclical one. Second, contrary
to the unemployment rate used in eq.(4), the cyclical unemployment rate used when es-
timating eq.(5) with the GMM estimators has a positive and significant impact on the
private savings ratio. This result suggests that precautionary savings motives, triggered
by labor income uncertainty stemming from high unemployment during recessions, can
explain our documented countercyclical private savings ratio. Third, the estimated im-
pact of the cyclical government savings ratio obtained from the estimation of eq.(5) is
very similar to the estimated impact of the government savings ratio obtained from the
estimation of eq.(4). This seems to indicate that the impact of government savings on
private savings is strongly related to the business cycle. As such, the Ricardian offset
effect is also capable of explaining our documented countercyclical private savings ratio.
The GMM estimation results however are again subject to a potential weak instru-
ments problem. In Table 2 (right panel) we find values for the Cragg and Donald (1993)
test that are below the critical value of about 4.5 reported by Stock and Yogo (2004)
so that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak. To check
whether our results are valid despite this potential problem, we calculate confidence sets
based on the Anderson-Rubin statistic (see Anderson and Rubin (1949)). This approach
constitutes a fully robust method suggested by Stock et al. (2002) that does not rely
on whether the instruments are strong to test hypotheses on the parameters of interest
(see Kiley (2010) for an application). We construct 90% confidence sets based on the
average Anderson-Rubin statistic over 19 countries to check the significance of the two
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Figure 1: Anderson-Rubin confidence set for the impact of the cyclical unemployment rate and
the cyclical government savings ratio on the private savings ratio
(a) No cross-sectional dependence
-.20
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6
Parameter cyclical unemployment rate
P
a r
a m
e t
e r
 c
y c
l i c
a l
 g
o v
e r
n m
e n
t  s
a v
i n
g s
 r a
t i o
(b) Cross-sectional dependence
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Parameter cyclical unemployment rate
P
a r
a m
e t
e r
 c
y c
l i c
a l
 g
o v
e r
n m
e n
t  s
a v
i n
g s
 r a
t i o
Note: 90% confidence sets are based on the average Anderson-Rubin statistic over 19 countries.
Technical details are given in Appendix C.
parameters that are reported to be significant in Table 2 (right panel), i.e., the coefficient
on the cyclical government savings ratio and the coefficient on the cyclical unemployment
rate. Details are provided in Appendix C. In Figure 1(a) we report this confidence set
for a standard regression equation of the private savings ratio on its lagged value, on
the cyclical unemployment rate, and on the cyclical government savings ratio; in Fig-
ure 1(b) we report the confidence set obtained from this regression augmented with the
cross-sectional averages of the included variables to account for potential cross-sectional
dependence. The instrument set used contains the same lags as the one used to conduct
the GMM estimations reported in Table 2. From both figures we note that the confidence
sets (shaded areas) contain the value of 0 for the parameter on the cyclical government
savings ratio, but not for the parameter on the cyclical unemployment rate. As such, we
are able to confirm that there is a positive and significant impact on the savings ratio
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of the cyclical unemployment rate, but we cannot confirm that there is a negative and
significant effect of the cyclical government savings ratio on the private savings ratio.16
4 Conclusions
This paper has examined empirically how the business cycle affects the private savings to
GDP ratio in a panel of 19 OECD countries over the period 1971-2009 using panel data
estimation methods that take into account a large number of econometric complications
(persistence in the savings ratio, endogeneity of the regressors, cross-country parame-
ter heterogeneity, cross-sectional dependence, stationarity issues, omitted variables, and
instrument strength).
An empirical analysis is called for since economic theory is ambiguous about the
effects of the business cycle on the private savings ratio. On the one hand, the life
cycle/permanent income theory predicts a procyclical private savings ratio. On the other
hand, the theory of precautionary savings predicts a countercyclical private savings ratio.
Using both unemployment- and GDP-based business cycle measures, we have found
robust evidence that the private savings ratio is countercyclical, i.e., it increases dur-
ing recessions. The finding of a countercyclical private savings ratio implies two things.
First, as far as business cycles are concerned, business cycle fluctuations are amplified by
changes in the private savings ratio. The private savings ratio increases during a recession
so that the fraction of income that is consumed decreases and this leads to a further fall
in aggregate demand. Moreover, since a larger fraction of income is saved, the fiscal mul-
16Because it is known that the Anderson and Rubin (1949) statistic may have low power to reject false
null hypotheses (see Stock et al. (2002)), we have also calculated confidence sets based on the Kleibergen
(2002) statistic. The latter has better power properties. Those confidence sets, however, were strongly
non-convex and, as such, we think that the reported Anderson and Rubin (1949) sets are more reliable.
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tiplier falls during a recession, which reduces the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus packages
to fight the recession. Second, as far as economic growth is concerned, the increase in the
private savings ratio during a recession positively affects long-run economic growth as it
increases capital accumulation.
We have then empirically investigated three theories that unambiguously predict a
countercyclical private savings ratio: a Ricardian offset effect, the presence of credit
constraints, and the existence of a precautionary savings motive induced by labor income
uncertainty. We have tested these theories by regressing the private savings ratio on the
lagged private savings ratio, on the (cyclical) government savings ratio (Ricardian offset
effect), on the (cyclical) private sector credit to GDP ratio (credit constraints) and on the
(cyclical) unemployment rate (precautionary savings). We have found robust evidence
only for a precautionary savings explanation of a countercyclical private savings ratio.
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Appendices
A Data and variables
We use annual data. Data are taken from OECD National Accounts, OECD Economic
Outlook (different years), and IMF International Financial Statistics. Data availability
determines the sample period which is 1971-2009. The sample contains 19 countries: Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
Nominal private savings are calculated by subtracting nominal governments savings
from nominal national savings. Nominal national savings (national currency) are obtained
from OECD National Accounts while nominal government savings (national currency) are
obtained from OECD Economic Outlook. Nominal GDP (national currency), the GDP
deflator (base year 2005=100), and the unemployment rate (in %) are taken from OECD
Economic Outlook. Domestic credit to the private sector is taken from IMF International
Financial Statistics (in percentage to GDP). For the latter series the missing observations
at the end of the sample for Canada (the year 2009) and for Norway (the years 2007 to
2009) have been forecasted using linear extrapolation. This extrapolation is based on a
regression of these countries’ credit ratio on the lagged credit ratio and on the current
value of the cross-country average of the credit ratio (where the cross-country average is
calculated over the remaining countries in the sample).
After deflating nominal private savings, nominal government savings, and nominal
GDP by the GDP deflator we obtain respectively real private savings SPit , real government
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savings SGit , and real GDP Yit. By dividing the unemployment rate (in percentage) by
100 we obtain the unemployment rate Uit in ratio form. By multiplying domestic credit
to the private sector as a ratio to GDP by real GDP we obtain real domestic credit to
the private sector CREit.
The private savings ratio sit, the government savings ratio s
G
it , and the domestic credit
to the private sector ratio creit are given by respectively sit =
SPit
Yit
, sGit =
SGit
Yit
, and creit =
CREit
Yit
. The change in the unemployment rate ∆Uit and real GDP growth ∆ ln(Yit) are
given by respectively ∆Uit = Uit − Uit−1 and ∆ ln(Yit) = ln(Yit)− ln(Yit−1).
To calculate real potential GDP Y¯it, the natural unemployment rate U¯it, the trend
in real government savings S¯Git , and the trend in domestic credit to the private sector
¯CREit we apply a Hodrick-Prescott filter to respectively Yit, Uit, S
G
it , and CREit (all with
smoothing parameter equal to 100 as is standard when dealing with annual data). The
cyclical components of these variables are then obtained as respectively Y˜it = Yit − Y¯it
(i.e., the output gap), U˜it = Uit − U¯it (i.e., the unemployment gap), S˜Git = SGit − S¯Git , and
C˜REit = CREit − ¯CREit. The output gap ratio is then given by Yit−Y¯itY¯it , the cyclical
government savings ratio is given by s˜Git =
S˜Git
Y¯it
, and the cyclical domestic credit ratio is
given by c˜reit =
C˜REit
Y¯it
.
B Omitted variables bias and lower bound result
B.1 Theorem
Consider the following equation for y,
y = X1β1 +X2β2 + 
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where X1 and X2 are regressors with corresponding regression parameters β1 and β2. We
assume that β1 > 0 and β2 > 0. This is without loss of generality as the signs of X1 and
X2 can be adjusted to make sure these restrictions hold. If instead of the above equation
we estimate
y = X1β1 + η
to obtain an estimate for β1, then this estimate, which we denote by β˜1, is a lower bound
of the true parameter β1 if and only if cov(X1, X2) < 0. To see this write the expectation
of the estimate β˜1 conditional on both X1 and X2 as E(β˜1|X1, X2) = β1 + cov(X1,X2)V (X1) β2
(see e.g., Greene (2003), p. 148-149). Noting that if β1 > 0, β2 > 0, and V (X1) > 0 then
E(β˜1|X1, X2) < β1 if and only if cov(X1, X2) < 0.
B.2 Application
Applying the theorem to our application requires three steps. First, we note that the pri-
vate savings ratio s equals y. Second, we have included variables that predict a counter-
cyclical savings ratio s, namely the unemployment rate U (which itself is countercyclical),
the credit to GDP ratio cre (which is procyclical), and the government savings to GDP
ratio sG (which is procyclical). We transform the latter two variables into countercyclical
variables by multiplying them by -1, i.e., −cre and −sG. As such, the variables U , −cre,
and −sG are countercyclical variables that predict a countercyclical savings ratio s im-
plying that the impact on the savings ratio of all three variables is positive. They belong
to X1 and we have β1 > 0. Third, we have excluded variables that predict a procyclical
savings ratio s, namely the inflation rate, real GDP growth (which are both procyclical),
and the government transfers to GDP ratio (which is countercyclical). We transform the
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latter variable into a procyclical variable by multiplying it by -1, i.e., minus government
transfers to GDP. As such, the inflation rate, real GDP growth, and minus the govern-
ment transfers to GDP ratio are procyclical variables that predict a procyclical savings
ratio s implying that the impact on the savings ratio of all three variables is positive.
They belong to X2 and we have β2 > 0.
If the common business cycle component is the main driving force of both X1 and X2,
then the covariance between the included countercyclical variable X1 and the excluded
procyclical variable X2 is negative, i.e., cov(X1, X2) < 0 and the estimated coefficient β˜1
for the impact of the countercyclical variable on y in a regression with only a counter-
cyclical variable is a lower bound for the true impact β1.
To the extent that the variables X1 and X2 are not driven only by a common business
cycle component, the covariance between both is not necessarily dominated by the business
cycle. In this case determining the sign of the covariance cov(X1, X2) and establishing
the lower bound result is not possible. By calculating and using the cyclical component
of X1 instead of X1 (see section 3.2.2b)), the business cycle component is the dominant
driving process of X1 so that a negative correlation between the cyclical component of X1
and the excluded procyclical variable X2 is obtained and the lower bound result holds.
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C Anderson-Rubin confidence sets
C.1 Anderson-Rubin statistic
When the savings equations in the paper are estimated by GMM methods, they fit into
the following general framework,
y = Xγ + Y β + µ
Y = Xφ+ Zpi + ν
The first equation denotes the estimated equation for the dependent variable. The de-
pendent variable is denoted by the Tx1 vector y which depends on the TxK1 matrix of
exogenous variables X and on the TxM matrix of endogenous variables Y . The second
equation is the auxiliary equation for the endogenous regressors Y which depends on the
TxK1 matrix of exogenous variables X and on the TxK2 matrix of instruments Z. If
we ignore cross-sectional dependence (e.g., when calculating the MG-GMM estimator),
the matrix X in our application contains a constant and the lagged dependent variable
(i.e., since we find no autocorrelation in the residuals, the lagged dependent variable is
exogenous). If we do not ignore cross-sectional dependence (e.g., when calculating the
CCEMG-GMM estimator), the matrix X in our application contains a constant, the
lagged dependent variable, and the cross-sectional averages of all included variables.
After projecting out the exogenous variables X from the model we obtain,
y˜ = Y˜ β + µ
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Y˜ = Z˜pi + ν
where y˜ = Mxy, Y˜ = MxY , and Z˜ = MxZ with Mx = I − X(X ′X)−1X ′ for which we
have MxX = 0, Mxµ = µ, and Mxν = ν.
The Anderson-Rubin statistic (see Anderson and Rubin (1949)) measures the degree
of orthogonality between the instruments Z˜ and the residual y˜ − Y˜ β0 calculated at the
parameter vector β0. It is given by,
AR(β0) =
(y˜ − Y˜ β0)′Pz˜(y˜ − Y˜ β0)
(y˜ − Y˜ β0)′Mz˜(y˜ − Y˜ β0)/(T −K1 −K2)
where Pz˜ = Z˜(Z˜
′Z˜)−1Z˜ ′ and where Mz˜ = I − Pz˜. This statistic is asymptotically χ2
distributed with K2 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis β = β0 (see Stock et al.
(2002)). As noted by Kiley (2010) the statistic uses no information on the relationship
between the instruments Z˜ and the endogenous regressors Y˜ and therefore does not rely
on whether the instruments are strong or weak. Rather, it is based on the idea that
if the true parameter vector β is equal to the hypothesized value β0 then the degree of
orthogonality between the instruments Z˜ and the implied error term µ0 = y˜ − Y˜ β0 will
be small. If, on the other hand, β is far from the hypothesized value β0 then the degree
of orthogonality between the instruments Z˜ and the implied error term µ0 will be large.
17
17Mathematically, if β = β0 then E[µ
′
0Z˜] will be small but if β 6= β0 then E[µ′0Z˜] will be large. To see
this write µ0 = y˜− Y˜ β0 = Y˜ β+µ− Y˜ β0 = Y˜ (β−β0) +µ. If β = β0 then the instruments are orthogonal
to µ0 because µ0 equals the true µ which by definition is uncorrelated with the instruments (i.e., in our
case because we use lags as instruments). If β 6= β0 then the instruments are not necessarily orthogonal
to µ0.
45
C.2 Confidence sets
We calculate Anderson-Rubin confidence sets as follows. We define a grid from -1 to +1
over both parameters β and δ from eq.(5).18 We define 400 points per dimension of the
two-dimensional (β,δ)-grid. Per country we then calculate the Anderson-Rubin statistic
for every point on the grid, i.e., we hypothesize all points on this grid (i.e., 4002 in total).
We then average the statistics calculated for every point on the grid over 19 countries
and we check whether the hypothesized points are rejected or not.19 If the p-value of the
average Anderson-Rubin statistic for a point on the grid is larger than 10% that means
that the average Anderson-Rubin statistic is relatively small at this point on the grid.
This then suggests that at this point there is orthogonality between the instruments and
the error term. As such, this point on the grid is close to the true β and δ. The point on
the grid is then considered to belong to the 90% confidence set.
18Note that we set the coefficient γ on the cyclical credit ratio equal to 0 based on the estimation
results reported in Table 2 (right panel).
19The Anderson-Rubin test statistic follows a χ2 distribution. Assuming that the country-specific test
statistics are independent, the average Anderson-Rubin test statistic still follows a χ2 distribution with
the same number of degrees of freedom as its country-specific counterpart.
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D Tables
Table 3: Cyclicality government savings ratio, credit ratio, and unemployment rate: estimation
results
Sample period: 1971-2009, 19 countries
Dependent variable: (a) Government savings ratio (b) Private credit to GDP ratio
MG MG-GMM CCEMG CCEMG-GMM MG MG-GMM CCEMG CCEMG-GMM
sGit−1 0.766
∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.035) (0.040) (0.045)
crei,t−1 0.981∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.018) (0.041) (0.036)
Yit−Y¯it
Y¯it
0.302∗∗∗ 0.100 0.205∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗ 0.754∗∗
(0.043) (0.092) (0.047) (0.071) (0.157) (0.160) (0.285) (0.365)
Cumby-Huizinga test 4.074 3.276 1.738 1.442 3.406 2.723 2.599 2.432
[0.044] [0.070] [0.187] [0.230] [0.065] [0.099] [0.107] [0.119]
Pesaran CD test 28.314 27.456 2.869 1.858
[0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.063]
Hansen test 6.678 3.294 4.328 3.663
[0.035] [0.193] [0.115] [0.160]
Cragg-Donald test 10.005 8.338 14.994 9.412
Dependent variable: (c) Unemployment rate
MG MG-GMM CCEMG CCEMG-GMM
Uit−1 0.840∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.026) (0.030) (0.038)
Yit−Y¯it
Y¯it
-0.237∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗
(0.029) (0.050) (0.034) (0.048)
Cumby-Huizinga test 7.572 6.031 4.580 2.877
[0.006] [0.014] [0.032] [0.090]
Pesaran CD test 19.446 17.036
[0.000] [0.000]
Hansen test 8.512 5.715
[0.014] [0.057]
Cragg-Donald test 9.611 5.867
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values are in square brackets. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% respectively. The GMM estimators use a consistent estimate for the optimal weighting matrix constructed from a White
estimator allowing for heteroskedasticity. The Cumby-Huizinga test shows the average of the individual countries’ Cumby and
Huizinga (1992) autocorrelation test, testing the null of no autocorrelation against the alternative of MA(1) errors. The Pesaran
CD test is the Pesaran (2004) test, testing the null of cross-sectional independence. The Hansen test shows the average of the
individual countries’ Hansen (1982) J-test of overidentifying restrictions which tests the joint validity of the instruments used.
The Cragg-Donald test is the average of the individual countries’ Cragg and Donald (1993) test statistic for weak instruments.
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Table 4: Im-Pesaran-Shin tests for unit roots in a heterogeneous panel
Sample period: 1971-2009, 19 countries
No cross-sectional dependence Cross-sectional dependence
c c/t c c/t
sit -3.925 -5.417 -3.625 -3.771
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
sGit -3.511 -2.181 -2.933 -3.239
[0.000] [0.0146] [0.002] [0.001]
creit 11.326 4.103 3.543 1.617
[0.999] [0.999] [0.999] [0.947]
Uit -2.013 -2.524 -2.439 -2.935
[0.022] [0.006] [0.007] [0.002]
Notes: The reported statistic is the W test by Im et al. (2003) which follows a standard normal distribution under the null
hypothesis of a unit root (against a one-sided alternative). The p-value is given in square brackets. The statistics calculated under
the header ”No cross-sectional dependence” are based on untransformed data and do not take into account potential common
factors in the data. The statistics calculated under the header ”Cross-sectional dependence” are based on data in deviations from
the cross-sectional mean to eliminate potential common factors in the data. The W statistic is based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) tests conducted at the individual country level. The number of lags added to the individual country ADF regression
is country-specific and is based on the specification that optimizes the Akaike information criterion (the maximum number of
lags allowed equals 9). Columns with header ”c” indicate that a country-specific constant but no trend has been added to the
individual country ADF regression. Columns with header ”c/t” indicate that a country-specific constant and a country-specific
trend have been added to the individual country ADF regression.
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